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Abstract
Federated Learning is the current state of the art in support-
ing secure multi-party ML: data is maintained on the owner’s
device and is aggregated through a secure protocol [11].
However, this process assumes a trusted centralized infras-
tructure for coordination and clients must trust that the cen-
tral service does not maliciously omit client contributions or
use the byproducts of client data.
As a response, we propose Biscotti: a fully decentralized
P2P approach to multi-party ML, which uses blockchain and
crypto primitives to coordinate a privacy-preserving ML pro-
cess between peering clients. Our evaluation demonstrates
that Biscotti is scalable, fault tolerant, and defends against
known attacks. For example, Biscotti is able to protect the
performance of the global model at scale even when 45% of
adversaries are trying to poison the model [24].
1 Introduction
A common thread in ML applications is the collection of
massive amounts of training data, which is often centralized
for analysis. However, when training ML models in a multi-
party setting, users must share their potentially sensitive in-
formation with a centralized service.
Federated learning [11, 30] is a prominent solution for
high scale secure multi-party ML: clients train a shared
model with a secure aggregator without revealing their un-
derlying data or computation. But, doing so introduces a
subtle threat: clients, who previously acted as passive data
contributors, are now actively involved in the training pro-
cess [24]. This presents new privacy and security chal-
lenges [6].
Prior work has demonstrated that adversaries can attack
the shared model through poisoning attacks [9, 38], in which
an adversary contributes adversarial updates to influence
shared model parameters. Adversaries can also attack the
privacy of other other clients in federated learning. In an
information leakage attack, an adversary poses as an honest
client and attempts to steal or de-anonymize sensitive train-
ing data through careful observation and isolation of a vic-
tim’s model updates [23, 31].
Solutions to these two attacks are at tension and are in-
herently difficult to achieve together: client contributions or
data can be made public and verifiable to prevent poisoning,
but this violates the privacy guarantees of federated learning.
Client contributions can be made more private, but this elimi-
nates the potential for accountability from adversaries. Prior
work has attempted to solve these two attacks individually
through centralized anomaly detection [46], differential pri-
vacy [4, 19, 21] or secure aggregation [11]. However, a pri-
vate and decentralized solution that solves both attacks con-
currently does not yet exist. In addition, these approaches are
inapplicable in contexts where a trusted centralized authority
does not exist. This is the focus of our work.
Because ML does not require strong consensus or con-
sistency to converge [41], traditional strong consensus pro-
tocols such as BFT protocols [14] are too restrictive for
ML workloads. To facilitate private, verifiable, crowd-
sourced computation, distributed ledgers (blockchains) [36]
have emerged. Through design elements, such as publicly
verifiable proof of work, eventual consistency, and ledger-
based consensus, blockchains have been used for a variety
of decentralized multi-party tasks such as currency manage-
ment [22, 36], archival data storage [5, 33] and financial au-
diting [37]. Despite this wide range of applications, a fully
realized, accessible system for large scale multi-party ML
that is robust to both attacks on the global model and attacks
on other clients does not exist.
We propose Biscotti, a decentralized public P2P system
that co-designs a privacy-preserving multi-party ML process
with a blockchain ledger. Peering clients join Biscotti and
contribute to a ledger to train a global model, under the as-
sumption that peers are willing to collaborate on building
ML models, but are unwilling to share their data. Each peer
has a local training data set that matches the desired objec-
tive of the training process and increases training data di-
versity. Biscotti is designed to support stochastic gradient
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descent (SGD) [13], an optimization algorithm which itera-
tively selects a batch of training examples, computes their
gradients against the current model parameters, and takes
gradient steps in the direction that minimizes the loss func-
tion. SGD is general purpose and can be used to train a vari-
ety of models, including deep learning [16].
The Biscotti blockchain coordinates ML training between
the peers. Each peer has a local training data set that matches
the learning goal of the global model and provides train-
ing data diversity. Peers in the system are weighed by the
value, or stake, that they have in the system. Inspired by
prior work [22], Biscotti uses proof of stake in combination
with verifiable random functions (VRFs) [32] to select key
roles that help to arrange the privacy and security of peer
SGD updates. Our use of stake prevents groups of colluding
peers from overtaking the system without a sufficient stake
ownership.
With Biscotti’s design our primary contribution is to com-
bine several prior techniques into one coherent system that
provides secure and private multi-party machine learning in
a highly distributed setting. In particular, Biscotti prevents
peers from poisoning the model through the Multi-KRUM
defense [10] and provides privacy through differentially pri-
vate noise [4] and Shamir secrets for secure aggregation [45].
Most importantly, Biscotti combines these techniques with-
out impacting the accuracy of the final model, achieving
identical model performance as federated learning.
We evaluated Biscotti on Azure and considered its perfor-
mance, scalability, churn tolerance, and ability to withstand
different attacks. We found that Biscotti can train an MNIST
softmax model with 100 peers on a 60,000 image dataset
in 60 minutes, which is 5x slower than a similar federated
learning deployment. Biscotti is fault tolerant to node churn
every 15 seconds across 50 nodes, and converges even with
such churn. Furthermore, we show that Biscotti is resilient
to information leakage attacks [31] that require knowledge
of a client’s SGD update and a label-flipping poisoning at-
tack [24] from prior work.
2 Challenges and contributions
We now describe the key challenges in designing a peer to
peer (P2P) solution for multi-party ML and the key pieces in
Biscotti’s design that resolve each of these challenges.
Sybil attacks: VRFs based on proof of stake. In a P2P
setting adversaries can collude or generate aliases to increase
their influence in a sybil attack [18].
Inspired by Algorand [22], Biscotti uses three verifiable
random functions (VRFs) [32] to select a subset of peers for
the different stages of the training process: adding noise to
updates, validating an update, and securely aggregating the
update. To mitigate the effect of sybils, these VRFs select
peers proportionally to peer stake, ensuring that an adver-
sary cannot increase their influence in the system without
increasing their total stake.
Poisoning attacks: update validation using KRUM. In
multi-party ML, peers possess a relatively disjoint and pri-
vate sub-set of the training data. As mentioned above, pri-
vacy can be exploited by adversaries to provide cover for
poisoning attacks.
In multi-party settings, known baseline models are not
available to peers, so Biscotti validates an SGD update by
evaluating an update with respect to the updates submitted
by other peers. Biscotti validates an SGD update using the
Multi-KRUM algorithm [10], which rejects updates that push
the model away from the direction of the majority of the up-
dates. More precisely, in each round, a committee of peers
is selected to filter out poisoned updates by a majority vote
and each member of the committee filters out poisoned SGD
updates with Multi-KRUM.
Information leakage attacks: random verifier peers and
differentially private updates using pre-committed noise.
By observing a peer’s SGD updates from each verification
round, an adversary can perform an information leakage at-
tack [31] and recover details about a victim’s training data.
Biscotti prevents such attacks during update verification
in two ways. First, it uses verifiable random functions
(VRFs) [32] to ensure that malicious peers cannot determin-
istically be selected to verify a victim’s gradient. Second,
peers send differentially-private updates [4, 19] to verifier
peers: before sending a gradient to a verifier, pre-committed
ε-differentially private noise is added to the update, masking
the peer’s gradient in a way that neither the peer nor the at-
tacker can influence or observe. By verifying noised SGD
updates, peers in Biscotti can verify the updates of other
peers without observing their un-noised versions.
Utility loss with differential privacy: secure update
aggregation and cryptographic commitments. The
blockchain-based ledger of model updates allows for audit-
ing of state, but this transparency is counter to the goal of
privacy-preserving multi-party ML. For example, the ledger
trivially leaks information if we store SGD updates directly.
Verification of differentially private updates discussed
above are one piece of the puzzle. The second piece is se-
cure update aggregation: a block in Biscotti does not store
updates from individual peers, but rather an aggregate that
obfuscates any single peer’s contribution during that round
of SGD. Biscotti uses a verifiable secret sharing scheme [26]
to aggregate the updates so that any individual update re-
mains hidden through cryptographic commitments.
However, secure aggregation can be either done on the
differentially-private updates or the original updates. This
design choice represents a privacy-utility tradeoff in the
trained model. By aggregating differentially-private updates
the noise is pushed into the ledger and the final model has
lower utility. By aggregating original updates we can achieve
utility that is identical to federated learning training. Fig-
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Figure 1: The utility trade-off if differentially private noise
is added directly to the updates in the ledger. Biscotti, which
aggregates non-noisy updates, has the best utility (lowest val-
idation error).
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Figure 2: Visualized privacy trade-off for curves in Figure 1.
ure 1 illustrates this trade-off on the MNIST dataset over
100 iterations while training a softmax model for different
values of ε (smaller ε means more noise and more privacy,
but lower utility, or validation error). The bottom-most line
in the Figure is Biscotti, which aggregates original updates:
a design choice that we have made to prioritize utility. By
default Biscotti uses a batch value of 35. Figure 2 illustrates
the privacy-utility trade-off visually for batches with noisy
updates as compared to Biscotti (right-most image), which
aggregates un-noised updates. The images are reconstructed
using information leakage attack on the aggregated gradients
with respect to the female class in the LFW dataset [31].
3 Assumptions and threat model
We assume a public machine learning system that is backed
by an auxiliary measure of stake. Stake may be derived from
an online data sharing marketplace, a shared reputation score
among competing agencies or auxiliary information on a so-
cial network.
Like federated learning, Biscotti assumes that users are
willing to collaborate on building ML models among each
other, but are unwilling to directly share their data when do-
ing so [30]. Each peer has a private, locally-held training
data set that matches the learning goal of the global model,
but each peer’s dataset has sufficient utility to increase per-
formance of the global model.
3.1 Design assumptions
Proof of stake. Users in the system are weighed by the value
they have in the system [22]. We assume that there is a proof
of stake function that is available to all nodes in the system,
that takes a peer identifier and returns the fraction of stake
that this peer has in the system. Peers accrue stake as they
contribute towards building the global model either by con-
tributing SGD updates or by facilitating the training process
by being part of the verification and aggregation committees.
We assume that at any point in time the majority of stake
in the system is honest and the stake function to be prop-
erly bootstrapped: upon initialization and onwards, any set
of peers that has a majority of stake in the system is legiti-
mate and will not attempt to subvert the system.
In addition to this, we also assume that the stake a peer ac-
crues during the training process is proportional to the peer’s
utility of the trained model.
Blockchain topology. Each peer is connected to some sub-
set of other peers in a topology that allows flooding-based
dissemination of updates that eventually reach all peers. For
example, this could be a random mesh topology with flood-
ing, similar to the one used for transaction and block dissem-
ination in Bitcoin [36].
Machine learning. We assume that ML training parameters
are known to all peers: the model, its hyperparameters, its
optimization algorithm and the learning goal of the system
(these are distributed in the first block). In a non-adversarial
setting, peers have local datasets that they wish to keep pri-
vate. When peers draw a sample from this data to compute
an SGD update, we assume that this is done uniformly and
independently [12]. This ensures that the Multi-KRUM gra-
dient validation [10] is accurate.
3.2 Attacker assumptions
Peers may be adversarial and send malicious updates to per-
form a poisoning attack on the shared model or an informa-
tion leakage attack against a target peer victim. In doing
so, we assume that the adversary may control multiple peers
in the system in a sybil attack [18]. We do not restrict ad-
versaries at the API level: they can provide arbitrary values
when computing, validating, or adding noise to gradient up-
dates. Although peers may be able to increase the number of
peers they control in the system, we assume that adversaries
cannot artificially increase their stake in the system except
by providing valid updates that pass Multi-KRUM [10].
When adversaries perform a poisoning attack, we assume
that their goal is to harm the performance of the final global
model. Our defense relies on filtering out malicious up-
dates that are sufficiently different from the honest clients
and are pushing the global model towards some sub-optimal
objective.This does not include attacks on unused parts of
the model topology, like backdoor attacks [6].
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When adversaries perform an information leakage attack,
we assume that they aim to learn properties of a victim’s lo-
cal dataset. Due to the vulnerabilities of secure aggregation,
we do not consider information leakage attacks with side in-
formation [20, 43] and class-level information leakage at-
tacks on federated learning [23], which attempt to learn the
properties of an entire target class.
4 Biscotti design
Biscotti implements peer-to-peer ML trained using SGD. For
this process, Biscotti’s design has the following goals:
• Convergence to an optimal global model (the model
trained without adversaries in a federated learning setting)
• Poisoning is prevented by verifying peer contributions
to the model
• Peer training data is kept private and information leak-
age attacks on training data are prevented
• Colluding peers cannot gain influence without acquir-
ing sufficient stake
Biscotti meets these goals through a blockchain-based de-
sign that we describe in this section.
Design overview. Peers join Biscotti and collaboratively
train a global model. Each block in the distributed ledger
represents a single iteration of SGD and the ledger contains
the state of the global model at each iteration. Figure 3
overviews the Biscotti design with a step-by-step of illustra-
tion of what happens during a single SGD iteration in which
a single block is generated.
In each iteration, peers locally compute SGD updates (step
1 in Figure 3). Since SGD updates need to be kept private,
each peer first masks their update using differentially private
noise. This noise is obtained from a unique set of noising
peers for each client selected by a VRF [32] (step 2 and
3 ).
The masked updates are validated by a VRF-selected ver-
ification committee to defend against poisoning. Each mem-
ber in the verification committee signs the commitment to
the peer’s unmasked update if it passes Multi-KRUM (step
4 ). If the majority of the committee signs an update (step
5 ), the signed update is divided into Shamir secret shares
(step 6 ) and given to a VRF-selected aggregation commit-
tee. The aggregation committee uses a secure protocol to
aggregate the unmasked updates (step 7 ). All peers who
contribute a share to the final update along with the peers
chosen for the verification and aggregation committees re-
ceives additional stake in the system.
The aggregate of the updates is added to the global model
in a newly created block which is disseminated to all the
peers and appended to the ledger (step 8 ). Using the up-
dated global model and stake, the peers repeat (step 1 ).
Next, we describe how we bootstrap the training process.
4.1 Initializing the training
Biscotti peers initialize the training process using informa-
tion in the first (genesis) block. We assume that this block
is distributed out of band by a trusted authority and the in-
formation within it is reliable. Each peer that joins Biscotti
obtains the following information from the genesis block:
• Initial model state w0, and expected number of itera-
tions T
• The commitment public key PK for creating commit-
ments to SGD updates (see Appendix C)
• The public keys PKi of all other peers in the system
which are used to create and verify signatures during verifi-
cation
• Pre-commitments to T iterations of differentially pri-
vate noise ζ1..T for each SGD iteration by each peer (see
Figure 6 and Appendix B)
• The initial stake distribution among the peers
• A stake update function for updating a peer’s stake
when a new block is appended
4.2 Blockchain design
Distributed ledgers are constructed by appending read-only
blocks to a chain structure and disseminating blocks using a
gossip protocol. Each block maintains a pointer to its pre-
vious block as a cryptographic hash of the contents in that
block.
Each block in Biscotti (Figure 4) contains, in addition to
the previous block hash pointer, an aggregate (∆w) of SGD
updates from multiple peers and a snapshot of the global
model wt at iteration t. Newly appended blocks to the ledger
store the aggregated updates ∑∆wi of multiple peers. Each
block also contains a list of commitments for each peer i’s
update COMM (∆wi) for privacy and verifiability. These
commitments provide privacy by hiding the individual up-
dates, yet can be homomorphically combined to verify that
the update to the global model by the aggregator ∑∆wi was
computed honestly. The following equality holds if the list
of committed updates equal the aggregate sum:
COMM(∑∆wi) =∏
i
COMM(∆wi) (2)
The training process continues for a specified number of it-
erations T upon which the learning process is terminated and
each peer extracts the global model from the final block.
4.3 Using stake for role selection
For each iteration in Biscotti, public VRFs weighted by stake
designate roles (noiser, verifier, aggregator) to some peers in
the system. The VRF ensures that the influence of a peer
is bound by their stake (i.e. adversaries cannot trivially in-
crease their influence through sybils).
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Figure 3: The ordered steps in a single iteration of the Biscotti algorithm.
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Figure 4: Block contents at iteration t. Note that wt is
computed using wt−1 +Σwu where wt−1 is the global model
stored in the block at iteration t−1 and j is the set of verifiers
for iteration t.
A different VRF is used to designate each role. Peers can
take on zero or more roles in any given iteration. The output
of the noiser VRF should be unique to each peer to provide
additional privacy. Therefore, a peer i’s uses their public key
PKi as the random seed in the VRF (see Section 4.4). The
verification and aggregation VRFs are seeded with a global
public key and the SHA-256 hash of the previous block to
ensure that these roles are globally observable and verifiable.
Since an adversary cannot predict the future state of a block
until it is created, they cannot speculate on outputs of the
VRF and strategically perform attacks.
To assign each role to multiple peers, we use consistent
hashing (Figure 5). The initial SHA-256 hash is repeatedly
re-hashed: each new hash result is mapped onto a keyspace
ring where portions of the keyspace are proportionally as-
peer2
peer1
stake region
peer3
peer2
peerN
peer3
peer1
peer2
stake region
hash
h(hash)
h(h(hash))
Generated
Block
VRF
Figure 5: Biscotti uses a consistent hashing protocol based
on the current stake to determine the roles for each iteration.
signed to peers based on their stake. This provides the same
stake-based property as Algorand [22]: a peer’s probability
of winning this lottery is proportional to their stake.
At each iteration, peers run the respective VRFs to de-
termine whether they are an aggregator or verifier. Each
peer that is not an aggregator or verifier computes their set
of noise providers using the noise VRF. This noise VRF set
is also accompanied by a proof. The proof combined with
the peer’s public key enables every peer to determine that
the correct noise providers are selected by a particular peer.
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4.4 Noising protocol
Sending a peer’s SGD update directly to another peer may
leak sensitive information about their private dataset [31].
To prevent this, peers use differential privacy to hide their
updates prior to verification by adding noise sampled from
a normal distribution. This ensures that each step is (ε,δ )
differentially private by standard arguments in [19]. (see
Appendix B for formalisms).
Using pre-committed noise to thwart poisoning. Attackers
may maliciously use the noising protocol to execute poison-
ing or information leakage attacks. For example, a peer can
send a poisonous update ∆wpoison, and add noise ζp that un-
poisons this update to resemble an honest update ∆w, such
that ∆wpoison + ζp = ∆w. By doing this, a verifier observes
the honest update ∆w, but the poisonous update ∆wpoison is
applied to the model because the noise is removed in the final
aggregate.
To prevent this, Biscotti requires that every peer pre-
commits the noise vector ζt for every iteration t ∈ [1..T ] in
the genesis block. Since the updates cannot be generated in
advance without the knowledge of the global model, there-
fore a peer cannot effectively commit noise that unpoisons
an update. Furthermore, Biscotti requires that the noise that
is added is taken from a different peer than the one creating
the update. This peer is determined using a noising VRF and
further restricts the control that a malicious peer has over the
noise used to sneak poisoned updates past verification.
Using a VRF-chosen set of noisers to thwart information
leakage. A further issue may occur in which a noising peer A
and a verifier B can collude in an information leakage attack
against a victim peer C. The noising peer A can commit a set
of zero noise which does not hide the original gradient value
at all. When the victim peer C sends its noised gradient to the
verifier B, B performs an information leakage attack on client
C’s gradient back to its original training data. This attack is
viable because the verifier B knows that A is providing the
random noise and A provides zero noise.
This attack motivates Biscotti’s use of a private VRF that
selects a group of noising peers based on the victim C’s
public key. In doing so, an adversary cannot pre-determine
whether their noise will be used in a specific verification
round by a particular victim, and also cannot pre-determine
if the other peers in the noising committee will be malicious
in a particular round. Our results in Figure 13 show that the
probability of an information leakage is negligible given a
sufficient number of noising peers.
Protocol description. For an ML workload that may be ex-
pected to run for a specific number of iterations T , each peer
i generates T noise vectors ζt and commits these noise vec-
tors into the ledger, storing a table of size N by T (Figure 6).
When a peer is ready to contribute an update in an iteration,
Noise committed       
Noise committed
for iteration 1
comm(noise21)
comm(noise11)
comm(noiseN1 )
comm(noise1T )
comm(noise2T )
comm(noiseNT )
…
…
…
…
…
T iterations
N
peerspeer 2
by
Figure 6: Peers commit noise to an N by T structure. Each
row i contains all the noise committed by a single peer i,
and each column t contains potential noise to be used during
iteration t. When committing noise at an iteration i, peers
execute a VRF and request ζ ki from peer k
it runs the noising VRF and contacts each noising peer k,
requesting the noise vector ζk pre-committed in the gene-
sis block COMM(ζk). The peer then uses a verifier VRF to
determine the set of verifiers. The peer masks their update
using this noise and submits to these verifiers the masked
update, a commitment to the noise, and a commitment to the
unmasked update. It also submits the noise VRF proof which
attests to the verifier that its noise is sourced from peers that
are a part of their noise VRF set.
4.5 Verification protocol
The verifier peers are responsible for filtering out malicious
updates in a round by running Multi-KRUM on the received
pool of updates and accepting the top majority of the updates
received each round. Each verifier receives the following
from each peer i:
• The masked SGD update: (∆wi+∑k ζk)
• Commitment to the SGD update: COMM(∆wi)
• The set of k noise commitments:
{COMM(ζ1),COMM(ζ2), ...,COMM(ζk))}
• A VRF proof confirming the identity of the k noise
peers
When a verifier receives a masked update from another
peer, it can confirm that the masked SGD update is consis-
tent with the commitments to the unmasked update and the
noise by using the homomorphic property of the commit-
ments [26]. A masked update is legitimate if the following
equality holds:
COMM(∆wi+∑
k
εk) =COMM(∆wi)∗∏
k
COMM(∆ek)
Once the verifier receives a sufficiently large number of
updates R, it proceeds with selecting the best updates using
Multi-KRUM, as follows:
• For every peer i, the verifier calculates a score s(i)
which is the sum of euclidean distances of i’s update
to the closest R− f −2 updates. It is given by:
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s(i) = ∑i→ j ‖∆wi−∆w j‖2
where i→ j denotes the fact that ∆w j belongs to the
R− f −2 closest updates to ∆wi.
• The R− f peers with the lowest scores are selected
while the rest are rejected.
• The verifier signs the COMM(∆wi) using its public key
for all the updates that are accepted.
To prevent a malicious sybil verifier from accepting all
updates of its colluders in this stage, we require a peer to
obtain signatures from majority of the verifiers to get their
update accepted. Once a peer receives a majority number of
signatures from the verifiers, the update can be disseminated
for aggregation.
4.6 Aggregation protocol
All peers with a sufficient number of signatures in the verifi-
cation stage submit their SGD updates for aggregation which
will be eventually appended to the global model. The update
equation in SGD (see Appendix A) can be re-written as:
wt+1 = wt +
∆wveri f ied
∑
i=1
∆wi
where ∆wi is the verified SGD update of peer i and wt is the
global model at iteration t.
However, individual updates contain sensitive information
and cannot be directly shared for aggregation. This presents
a privacy dilemma: no peer should observe an update from
any other peer, but the sum of the updates must be stored in
a block.
The objective of the aggregation protocol is to enable a
set of m aggregators, predetermined by the VRF function, to
compute ∑ i∆wi without observing any individual updates.
Biscotti uses a technique that preserves privacy of the indi-
vidual updates if at least half of the m aggregators participate
honestly in the aggregation phase. This guarantee holds if
the VRF function selects a majority of honest aggregators,
which is likely when the majority of stake is honest.
Biscotti achieves the above guarantees using polynomial
commitments (see Appendix C) combined with verifiable se-
cret sharing [45] of individual updates. The update of length
d is encoded as a d-degree polynomial, which can be bro-
ken down into n shares such that (n = 2 ∗ (d + 1)). These
n shares are distributed equally among m aggregators. Since
an update can be reconstructed using (d+1) shares, it would
require m2 colluding aggregators to compromise the privacy
of an individual update. Therefore, given that any majority
of aggregators is honest and does not collude, the privacy of
an individual peer update is preserved.
A peer with a verified update already possesses a commit-
ment C = COMM(∆wi(x)) to its SGD update signed by a
majority of the verifiers from the previous step. To compute
and distribute its update shares among the aggregators, peer
i runs the following secret sharing procedure:
1. The peer computes the required set of secret shares
sm,i = {z,∆wi(z)|z ∈ Z} for aggregator m. In order
to ensure that an adversary does not provide shares
from a poisoned update, the peer computes a set of
associated witnesses witm,i = {COMM(Ψz(x))|Ψz(x) =
∆w(x)−∆w(z)
x−z }. These witnesses will allow the aggregator
to verify that the secret share belongs to the update ∆wi
committed to in C. It then sends < C,sm,i,witm,i > to
each aggregator along with the signatures obtained in
the verification stage.
2. After receiving the above vector from peer i, the aggre-
gator m runs the following sequence of validations:
(a) m ensures that C has passed the validation phase
by verifying that it has the signature of the major-
ity in the verification set.
(b) m verifies that in each share (z,∆wi(z)) ∈ sm,i
∆wi(z) is the correct evaluation at z of the poly-
nomial committed to in C. (For details, see Ap-
pendix C)
Once every aggregator has received shares for the mini-
mum number of updates u required for a block, each aggre-
gator aggregates its individual shares and shares the aggre-
gate with all of the other aggregators. As soon as a aggre-
gator receives the aggregated d+ 1 shares from at least half
of the aggregators, it can compute the aggregate sum of the
updates and create the next block. The protocol to recover
∑uj=1∆w j is as follows:
1. All m aggregators broadcast the sum of their accepted
shares and witnesses < ∑ui=1 smi ,∑
u
j=1 witm j >
2. Each aggregator verifies the aggregated broadcast
shares made by each of the other aggregators by check-
ing the consistency of the aggregated shares and wit-
nesses.
3. Given that m obtains the shares from m2 aggregators in-
cluding itself, m can interpolate the aggregated shares
to determine the aggregated secret ∑uj=1∆w j
Once m has figured out∑ui=1∆wi, it can create a block with
the updated global model. All commitments to the updates
and the signature lists that contributed to the aggregate are
added to the block. The block is then disseminated in the
network. Any peer in the system can verify that all updates
are verified by looking at the signature list and homomorphi-
cally combine the commitments to check that the update to
the global model was computed honestly (see 4.2). If any of
these conditions are violated, the block is rejected.
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4.7 Blockchain consensus
Because VRF-computed subsets are globally observable by
each peer, and based only on the SHA-256 hash of the latest
block in the chain, ledger forks should rarely occur in Bis-
cotti. For an update to be included in the ledger at any iter-
ation, the same noising/verification/aggregation committees
are used. Thus, race conditions between aggregators will not
cause forks in the ledger to occur as frequently as in e.g.,
BitCoin [36].
When a peer observes a more recent ledger state through
the gossip protocol, it can catch up by verifying that the com-
putation performed is correct by running the VRF for the
ledger state and by verifying the signatures of the designated
verifiers and aggregators for each new block.
In Biscotti, each verification and aggregation step occurs
only for a specified duration. Any updates that are not suc-
cessfully propagated in this period of time are dropped: Bis-
cotti does not append stale updates to the model once com-
peting blocks have been committed to the ledger. This syn-
chronous SGD model is acceptable for large scale ML work-
loads which have been shown to be tolerant of bounded asyn-
chrony [41]. However, these stale updates could be leveraged
in future iterations to lead to faster convergence if their learn-
ing rate is appropriately decayed [16]. We leave this as an
optimization for future work.
5 Implementation
We implemented Biscotti in 4,500 lines of Go 1.10 and 1,000
lines of Python 2.7 and released it as an open source project1.
We use Go to handle all networking and distributed systems
aspects of our design. We used PyTorch [39] to generate
SGD updates and noise during training. By building on the
general-purpose API in PyTorch, Biscotti can support any
model that can be optimized using SGD. We use the go-
python [3] library to interface between Python and Go.
We use the kyber [2] and CONIKS [1] libraries to imple-
ment the cryptographic parts of our system. We use CONIKS
to implement our VRF function and kyber to implement
the commitment scheme and public/private key mechanisms.
To bootstrap clients with the noise commitments and public
keys, we use an initial genesis block. We used the bn256
curve API in kyber for generating our commitments and pub-
lic keys that form the basis of the aggregation protocol and
verifier signatures. For signing updates, we use the Schnorr
signature [44] scheme instead of ECDSA because multiple
verifier Schnorr signatures can be aggregated together into
one signature [29]. Therefore, our block size remains con-
stant as the verifier set grows.
1https://github.com/DistributedML/Biscotti
Dataset Model Type Examples (n) Params (d)
Credit Card LogReg 21000 25
MNIST Softmax 60000 7850
Table 1: The final convergence rate and number of parame-
ters across other model types and parameters (LogReg, Soft-
max).
6 Evaluation
We had several goals when designing the evaluation of our
Biscotti prototype. We wanted to demonstrate that (1) Bis-
cotti is robust to poisoning attacks, (2) Biscotti protects the
privacy of an individual client’s data and (3) Biscotti is scal-
able, fault-tolerant and can be used to train different ML
models.
For experiments done in a distributed setting, we deployed
Biscotti to train an ML model across 20 Azure A4m v2 vir-
tual machines, with 4 CPU cores and 32 GB of RAM. We
deployed a varying number of peers in each of the VMs. The
VM’s were spread across six locations: West US, East US,
Central India, Japan East, Australia East and Western Eu-
rope. We measured the error of the global model against
a partitioned validation dataset and ran each experiment for
100 iterations. To evaluate Biscotti’s defense mechanisms,
we ran known inference and poisoning attacks on federated
learning [31, 24] and measured their effectiveness under var-
ious attack scenarios and Biscotti parameters. We also eval-
uated the performance implications of our design by isolat-
ing specific components of our system and varying the VRF
committee sizes with different numbers of peers.
By default, we deployed Biscotti with the parameter val-
ues in Table 2. Table 1 shows the datasets, types of model,
number of training examples n, and the number of parame-
ters d in the models that we used in our experiments.
We evaluated Biscotti with logistic regression and softmax
classifiers. However, due to the general-purpose PyTorch
API, we claim that Biscotti can generalize to models of arbi-
trary size and complexity, as long as they can be optimized
with SGD and can be stored in our block structure. We eval-
uate logistic regression with a credit card fraud dataset from
the UC Irvine data repository [17], which uses an individ-
ual’s financial and personal information to predict whether
or not they will default on their next credit card payment. We
evaluate softmax with the canonical MNIST [28] dataset, a
task that involves predicting a digit based on its image.
In local training we were able to train a model on the
Credit Card and MNIST datasets with accuracy of 98% and
92%, respectively.
6.1 Tolerating Poisoning Attacks
In this section, we evaluate Biscotti’s performance when
we subject the system to a poisoning attack as in Huang
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Parameter Default Value
Privacy budget (ε) 2
Delta (δ ) 10−5
Number of nodes 100
Number of noisers 2
Number of verifiers 3
Number of aggregators 3
Number of samples needed for Multi-
KRUM (R)
70
Adversary upper bound ( f < R−22 ) 33
Number of updates/block (u = R2 ) 35
Initial stake Uniform, 10 each
Stake update function Linear, + 5
Table 2: The default parameters used for all our experiments,
unless stated otherwise.
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Figure 7: Federated learning and Biscotti’s validation error
on the CreditCard dataset with 30% of poisoners.
et.al [24].
Biscotti vs Federated Learning Baseline. We deployed
Biscotti and federated learning and subjected both systems
to a poisoning attack while training on the Credit Card and
MNIST datasets.
We introduced 30% of the peers into the system with the
same malicious dataset: for credit card they labeled all de-
faults as non-defaults, and for MNIST these peers labeled all
1s as 7s. Figure 7 and 8 shows the validation error for both
datasets as compared to federated learning. The results show
that for both datasets the poisoned federated learning deploy-
ment struggled to converge. By contrast, Biscotti performed
as well as the baseline un-poisoned federated learning de-
ployment.
To evaluate the success of an attack, we define attack rate
as the fraction of target labels that are incorrectly predicted.
An attack rate of 1 specifies a successful attack while a value
close to zero indicates an unsuccessful one. For the credit
card dataset, the attack rate is the same as the validation error
since there is only one class in the dataset. We show the
attack rate in Biscotti and Federated Learning for MNIST in
Figure 9.
The figure illustrates that in federated learning, since no
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Figure 8: Federated learning and Biscotti’s validation error
on the MNIST dataset with 30% of poisoners.
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Figure 9: Attack rate comparison of federated learning and
Biscotti’s on the MNIST dataset with 30% of poisoners.
defense mechanisms exist, a poisoning attack creates a tug
of war between honest and malicious peers. On the other
hand, in Biscotti the Multi-KRUM mechanism settles after
some initial jostling. Furthermore, the combination of ver-
ification with the stake update function ensures that honest
peers gain influence over time. In this experiment, the stake
of the honest clients went from 70% to 87%.
Attack Rate vs Received Updates. Biscotti requires each
peer in the verification committee to collect a sufficient sam-
ple of updates before running Multi-KRUM. We evaluated
the effect of collecting varying percentages of total updates
in each round on the effectiveness of Multi-KRUM with dif-
ferent poisoning rates. To ensure uniformity and to eliminate
latency effects in the collection of updates, in these experi-
ments the verifiers waited for updates from all clients that
are not assigned to a VRF committee and then randomly
sampled a specified number of updates. In addition, we also
ensured that all verifiers deterministically sampled the same
set of updates by using the last block hash as the random
seed. This allows us to investigate how well Multi-KRUM
performs in a decentralized ML setting like Biscotti unlike
the original Multi-KRUM paper [10] in which updates from
all clients are collected before running Multi-KRUM.
Figure 10 show the results. As the percentage of poison-
ers in the system increases, a higher fraction of updates need
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Figure 10: Evaluating the effect of the number of sampled
updates each round on KRUM’s performance.
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Figure 11: KRUM’s performance in defending against a 30%
attack on the MNIST dataset for different settings of ε noise.
to be collected for Multi-KRUM to be effective (to achieve a
low attack rate). A large sample ensures that the poisoners do
not gain majority in the set being fed to Multi-KRUM, oth-
erwise Multi-KRUM cannot prevent poisoned updates from
leaking into the model.
Attack Rate vs Noise. To ensure that updates are kept pri-
vate in the verification stage, differentially private noise is
added to each update before it is sent to the verifier. This
noise is parametrized by the ε and δ parameters. The
δ parameter indicates the probability with which plain ε-
differential privacy is broken and is ideally set to a value
lower than 1/|d| where d is the dimension of the dataset.
Hence, we set δ to be 10−5 in all our experiments. ε repre-
sents privacy-loss and a lower value of ε indicates that more
noise is added to the updates. We investigate the effect of the
ε value on the performance of Multi-KRUM with 30% poi-
soners in a 100-node deployment with 70 received updates
in each round on the MNIST dataset. Figure 11 shows that
KRUM loses its effectiveness at values of ε ≤ 0.5 but per-
forms well on values of ε ≥ 1.
6.2 Privacy evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the privacy provided by secure
aggregation in Biscotti. We subject Biscotti to an informa-
tion leakage attack [31] and demonstrate that the effective-
ness of this attack decreases with the number of securely ag-
gregated updates in a block. We also show that the probabil-
ity of a successful collusion attack to recover an individual
client’s private gradient decreases as the size of the VRF set
grows.
Information leakage from aggregated gradients. We sub-
ject the aggregated gradients from several different datasets
to the gradient-based information leakage attack described
in [31]. We invert the aggregated gradient knowing that the
gradient for the weights associated with each class in the
fully connected softmax layer is directly proportional to the
input features. To infer the original features, we take the gra-
dients from a single class and invert them with respect to all
the classes in the CIFAR-10 (10 classes of objects/animals)
and LFW datasets(2 classes male/female). We visualize the
gradient in grayscale after reshaping to the original feature
dimensions in Figure 12. The aggregated gradient will have
data sampled from a mixture of classes including the target
class. Our results show that having a larger number of par-
ticipants in the aggregate decreases the impact of this attack.
As shown in Figure 12, as the number of aggregates batched
together increases, it becomes harder to distinguish the train-
ing examples.
By default Biscotti aggregates/batches 35 updates. Fig-
ure 12 illustrates how the individual class examples from the
inverted images are difficult to determine. It might be easy to
infer what a class looks like from the inversions. But if the
class does not represent an individual’s training set, secure
aggregation provides privacy. For example, in LFW we get
an image that represents what a male/female looks like but
we do not gain any information about the individual training
examples. Hence, the privacy gained is dependent on how
close the training examples are to the class representative.
Recovering a client’s individual gradient. We also evalu-
ate a proposed attack on the noising protocol, which aims to
de-anonymize peer gradients. This attack is performed when
a verifier colludes with several malicious peers. When boot-
strapping the system, the malicious peers pre-commit noise
that sums to 0. As a result, when a noising VRF selects these
noise elements for verification, the masked gradient is not
actually masked with any ε noise, allowing a malicious peer
to perform an information leakage attack on the victim.
We evaluated the effectiveness of this attack by deploying
Biscotti with 100 peers and varying the proportion of mali-
cious users (and malicious stake) in the system. Each mali-
cious peer is bootstrapped in the system with zero noise, and
performs an information leakage whenever they are chosen
as a verifier, and the total added noise is zero. We measured
the probability of a privacy violation occurring in this de-
ployment, and Figure 13 shows the probability of a privacy
violation as the proportion of malicious peers increases.
When the number of noisers for an iteration is 3, an adver-
sary needs at least 15% of stake to successfully unmask an
SGD update. This trend continues when 5 noisers are used:
over 30% of the stake must be malicious. When the number
of noisers is 10 (which has minimal additional overhead ac-
cording to Figure 17), privacy violations do not occur even
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Figure 12: The results of an information leakage attack on different number of aggregated gradients for different classes.
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Figure 13: Probability of a successful collusion attack to re-
cover an individual client’s gradient.
with 50% of malicious stake. By using a stake-based VRF to
select noising clients, Biscotti prevents adversaries from per-
forming information leakage attacks on other clients unless
their proportion of stake in the system is overwhelmingly
large.
6.3 Performance, Scalability, Fault Tolerance
Baseline performance. We start by evaluating how Biscotti
generalizes to different workloads and model types.
We first execute Biscotti in a baseline deployment and
compare it to the original federated learning baseline [30].
For this we partitioned the MNIST dataset [28] into 100
equal partitions, each of which was shared with an honest
peer on an Azure cluster of 20 VMs, with each VM hosting
5 peers. These Biscotti/Federated Learning peers collabo-
rated on training an MNIST softmax classifier, and after 100
iterations both models approached the global optimum. To
ensure a fair comparison, the number of updates included in
the model each round are kept the same. Federated Learning
selects 35 nodes at random out of 100 for every round and
receives updates from them while Biscotti includes the first
35 verified updates in the block. The convergence rate over
time for both systems is plotted in Figure 14 and the same
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Figure 14: Comparing the time to convergence of Biscotti to
a federated learning baseline.
convergence over the number of iterations is shown in Fig-
ure 15. In this deployment, Biscotti takes about 4.9 times
longer than Federated Learning (12.5 minutes vs. 60.6 min-
utes), yet achieves similar model performance (92% accu-
racy) after 100 iterations.
Performance cost break-down. In breaking down the over-
head in Biscotti, we deployed Biscotti over a varying number
peers in training on MNIST. We captured the total amount
of time spent in each of the major phases of our algorithm in
Figure 3: collecting the noise from each of the noising clients
(steps 2 and 3 ), executing verification via Multi-KRUM
and collecting the signatures (steps 4 and 5 ) and securely
aggregating the SGD update (steps 6 and 7 ). Figure 16
shows the breakdown of the total cost per iteration for each
stage under a deployment of 40, 60, 80 and 100 nodes.
The results show that the cost of each stage is almost con-
stant as we vary the number of peers in the system. Bis-
cotti spends most of its time in the aggregation phase since
it requires the aggregators to collect secret shares of all the
accepted updates and share the aggregated shares with each
other to generate a block. The noising phase is the fastest
since it only involves making a round trip to each of the nois-
ers while the verification stage involves collecting a prede-
fined percentage (70%) of updates to run Multi-KRUM in a
11
0 20 40 60 80 100
Training Iterations
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Va
lid
at
io
n 
Er
ro
r
Federated Learning 100 nodes
Biscotti 100 nodes
Figure 15: Comparing the iterations to convergence of Bis-
cotti to a federated learning baseline.
Noising Verification Aggregation
Secure Flooding Total
Figure 16: Breakdown of time spent in different mechanisms
in Biscotti (Figure 3) in deployments with varying number of
peers.
async manner from all the nodes. The time per iteration also
stays fairly constant as the number of nodes in the system
increase.
Scaling up VRF sets in Biscotti. We evaluate Biscotti’s
performance as we change the size of the VRF-computed
noiser/verifier/aggregator sets. For this we deploy Biscotti
on Azure with the MNIST dataset with a fixed size of 100
peers, and only vary the number of noisers needed for each
SGD update, number of verifiers used for each verification
committee, and the number of aggregators used in secure ag-
gregation. Each time one of these sizes was changed, the
change was performed in isolation; the rest of the commit-
tees used a set of 3. Figure 17 plots the average time taken
per iteration in each experiment.
Our results show that increasing the number of noisers,
verifiers and aggregator sets increases the time per iteration.
For example, the noising protocol requires additional round
trips: more signatures are needed from the verifier sets and
the secret shares need to be shared among a larger set of
aggregators along with the larger coordination overhead for
recovering the aggregate.
Training with node churn. A key feature of Biscotti’s P2P
design is that it is resilient to node churn (node joins and
failures). For example, the failure of any Biscotti node does
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Figure 17: The average amount of time taken per iteration
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Figure 18: The impact of churn on model performance.
not block or prevent the system from converging. We evalu-
ate Biscotti’s resilience to peer churn by performing a Credit
Card deployment with 50 peers, failing a peer at random at
a specified rate. For each specified time interval, a peer is
chosen randomly and is killed. In the next time interval, a
new peer joins the network and is bootstrapped, maintaining
a constant total number of 50 peers. Figure 18 shows the
rate of convergence for varying failure rates of 4, 2, and 1
peer(s) failing and joining per minute. When a verifier or an
aggregator fails, Biscotti defaults to the next iteration after a
timeout, so this does not harm convergence.
Even with churn Biscotti is able to make progress towards
the global objective. We found that Biscotti is resilient to
churn rates up to 4 nodes per minute (1 node joining and 1
node failing every 15 seconds).
7 Limitations
KRUM limitations. For KRUM to be effective against a
large number of poisoners, it needs to observe a large num-
ber samples in each round. This may not always be pos-
sible in a decentralized system where there is node churn.
In particular, this may compromise the system because ad-
versaries may race to contribute a majority of the samples.
However, Biscotti is compatible with other poisoning detec-
tion approaches and can integrate any poisoning detection
mechanism which uses SGD updates and does not require
individual update histories. For example, in a previous ver-
sion of Biscotti we used RONI [8] to validate updates.
Deep Learning. We showed that Biscotti is able to train
a softmax and logistic regression model with 7,850 and 25
parameters respectively. But, Biscotti might not scale to a
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large deep learning model with millions of parameters due to
the communication overhead. Strategies to reduce this might
require learning updates in a restricted parameter space or
compressing model updates [27]. We leave the training of
deep learning models with Biscotti to future work.
Leakage from the model. Since there is no differential pri-
vacy added to the updates present in the ledger, Biscotti is
vulnerable to attacks that exploit privacy leakage from the
model itself [20, 43]. Apart from differential privacy, these
attacks can also be mitigated by adding proper regulariza-
tion [43, 31] like dropout, or they may be thwarted if a class
does not represent an individual’s training data.
Stake limitations. The stake that a client possesses plays a
significant role in determining the chance that a node is se-
lected as a noiser/verifier/aggregator. Our assumption is that
a large stake-holder will not subvert the system because (1)
they accrue more stake by participating and (2) their stake
is tied to a monetary reward at the end of training. How-
ever, proof of stake is susceptible to nothing at stake and
long range attacks, which we consider to be out of scope.
8 Related work
Biscotti’s novelty lies in its ability to simultaneously handle
poisoning attacks and preserve privacy in a P2P multi-party
training context.
Securing ML. Similar to KRUM, AUROR [46] and ANTI-
DOTE [42] are alternative techniques to defend against poi-
soning that rely on anomaly detection. AUROR has been
mainly proposed for the model averaging use case and uses
k-means clustering on a subset of important features to detect
anomalies. ANTIDOTE uses a robust PCA detector to pro-
tect against attackers trying to evade anomaly-based meth-
ods.
Other defenses like TRIM [25] and RONI [8] filter out
poisoned data from a centralized training set based on their
impact on performance on the dataset. TRIM trains a model
to fit a subset of samples selected at random, and identifies
a training sample as an outlier if the error when fitting the
model to the sample is higher than a threshold. RONI trains
a model with and without a data point and rejects it if it de-
grades the performance of the classifier by a certain amount.
Finally, Baracaldo et al. [7] employ data provenance as a
measure against poisoning attacks by tracking the history of
the training data and removing information from anomalous
sources.
Poisoning attacks. Apart from label flipping attacks [24] we
evaluated, gradient ascent techniques [25, 35] are a popular
way of generating poisoned samples one sample at a time by
solving a bi-level optimization problem. Backdoor attacks
have also been proposed to make the classifier misclassify
an image if it contains certain pixels or a backdoor key. De-
fending against such attacks during training is a hard and
open problem in the literature.
Privacy attacks. Shokri et. al [48] demonstrated a mem-
bership inference attack using shadow model training that
learns if a victim’s data was used to train the model. Fol-
low up work [43] showed that it is quite easy to launch this
attack in a black-box setting. In addition, model inversion
attacks [20] have been proposed to invert class images from
the final trained model. However, we assume that these are
only effective if a class represents a significant chunk of a
person’s data e.g., facial recognition systems.
Additional security work in federated learning has re-
quired that public key infrastructure exists which validates
the identity of users [11], but prior sybil work has shown
that relying on public key infrastructure for user validation is
insufficient [50, 51].
Privacy-preserving ML. Cheng et al. recently proposed the
use of TEEs and privacy-preserving smart contracts to pro-
vide security and privacy to multi-party ML tasks [15]. But,
some TEEs have been found to be vulnerable [49]. Another
solution uses two party computation [34] and encrypts both
the model parameters and the training data when performing
multi-party ML.
Differential privacy is often applied to multi-party ML
systems to provide privacy [21, 4, 47]. However, its use
introduces privacy-utility tradeoffs. Biscotti uses differen-
tial privacy during update validation, but does not push noise
into the trained model, thus favoring utility.
9 Conclusion
The emergence of large scale multi-party ML workloads and
distributed ledgers for scalable consensus have produced two
rapid and powerful trends. Biscotti’s design lies at their con-
fluence. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first system
to provide privacy-preserving peer-to-peer ML through a dis-
tributed ledger, while simultaneously considering poisoning
attacks. And, unlike prior work, Biscotti does not rely on
trusted execution environments or specialized hardware. In
our evaluation we demonstrated that Biscotti can coordinate
a collaborative learning process across 100 peers and pro-
duces a final model that is similar in utility to state of the art
federated learning alternatives. We also illustrated its ability
to withstand poisoning and information leakage attacks, and
frequent failures and joining of nodes (one node joining, one
node leaving every 15 seconds).
Our Biscotti prototype is open source, runs on commodity
hardware, and interfaces with PyTorch, a popular framework
for machine learning.
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Appendix A Distributed SGD
Given a set of training data, a model structure, and a pro-
posed learning task, ML algorithms train an optimal set of
parameters, resulting in a model that optimally performs this
task. In Biscotti, we assume stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) [13] as the optimization algorithm.
In federated learning [30], a shared model is updated
through SGD. Each client uses their local training data and
their latest snapshot of the shared model state to compute the
optimal update on the model parameters. The model is then
updated and clients update their local snapshot of the shared
model before performing a local iteration again. The model
parameters w are updated at each iteration i as follows:
wt+1 = wt −ηt(λwt + 1b ∑
(xi,yi)∈Bt
∇l(wt ,xi,yi)) (1a)
where ηt represents a degrading learning rate, λ is a regular-
ization parameter that prevents over-fitting, Bt represents a
gradient batch of local training data examples (xi,yi) of size
b and ∇l represents the gradient of the loss function.
SGD is a general learning algorithm that can be used to
train a variety of models, including deep learning [13]. A
typical heuristic involves running SGD for a fixed number of
iterations or halting when the magnitude of the gradient falls
below a threshold. When this occurs, model training is con-
sidered complete and the shared model state wt is returned
as the optimal model w∗.
In a multi-party ML setting federated learning assumes
that clients possess training data that is not identically and
independently distributed (non-IID) across clients. In other
words, each client possesses a subset of the global dataset
that contains specific properties distinct from the global dis-
tribution.
When performing SGD across clients with partitioned
data sources, we redefine the SGD update ∆i,twg at iteration
t of each client i to be:
∆i,twg = ληtwg+
ηt
b ∑
(x,y)∈Bi,t
∇l(wg,x,y) (1b)
where the distinction is that the gradient is computed on a
global model wg, and the gradient steps are taken using a
local batch Bi,t of data from client i. When all SGD updates
are collected, they are averaged and applied to the model,
resulting in a new global model. The process then proceeds
iteratively until convergence.
To increase privacy guarantees in federated learning, se-
cure aggregation protocols have been added to the central
server [11] such that no individual client’s SGD update is di-
rectly observable by server or other clients. However, this
relies on a centralized service to perform such an aggrega-
tion and does not provide security against adversarial attacks
on ML.
Appendix B Differentially private SGD
We use the concept of (ε,δ ) differential privacy as explained
in Abadi et al. [4]. Each SGD step becomes (ε,δ ) differ-
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Data: Batch size b, Learning rate ηt , Privacy
parameters (ε,δ ), Expected update dimension d
Result: Precommited noise for an SGD update ζt ∀T
for iteration t ∈ [1..T ] do
// Sample noise of length d for each
expected sample in batch
for Example i ∈ [1..b] do
Sample noise ζi =N (0,σ2I) where
σ =
√
2log 1.25δ /ε
end
ζt = ηtb ∑i ζi
Commit ζt to the genesis block at column t.
end
Algorithm 1: Precommiting differentially Private noise for
SGD, taken from Abadi et al. [4].
entially private if we sample normally distributed noise as
shown in Algorithm 1. Each client commit noise to the gen-
esis block for all expected iterations T . We also requires
that the norm of the gradients be clipped to have a maximum
norm of 1 so that the noise does not completely obfuscate the
gradient.
This precommited noise is designed such that a neutral
third party aggregates a client update ∆i,twg from Equation
(1b) and precommitted noise ζt from Algorithm 1 without
any additional information. The noise is generated without
any prior knowledge of the SGD update it will be applied
to while retaining the computation and guarantees provided
by prior work. The noisy SGD update ∆˜i,twg follows from
aggregation:
∆˜i,twg = ∆i,twg+ζt
Appendix C Polynomial Commitments and
Verifiable Secret Sharing
Polynomial Commitments [26] is a scheme that allows com-
mitments to a secret polynomial for verifiable secret sharing
[45]. This allows the committer to distribute secret shares
for a secret polynomial among a set of nodes along with wit-
nesses that prove in zero-knowledge that each secret share
belongs to the committed polynomial. The polynomial com-
mitment is constructed as follows:
Given two groups G1 and G2 with generators g1 and g2
of prime order p such that there exists a asymmetric bilinear
pairing e : G1×G2 → GT for which the t-SDH assumption
holds, a commitment public key (PK) is generated such that
PK = {g,gα ,g(α)2 , ...,g(α)t} ∈ Gt+11 where α is the secret
key. The committer can create a commitment to a polyno-
mial φ(x) =∑tj=0 φ jx j of degree t using the commitment PK
such that:
COMM(PK,φ(x)) =
deg(φ)
∏
j=0
(gα
j
)φ j
Given a polynomial φ(x) and a commitment
COMM(φ(x)), it is trivial to verify whether the com-
mitment was generated using the given polynomial or
not. Moreover, we can multiply two commitments to
obtain a commitment to the sum of the polynomials in the
commitments by leveraging their homomorphic property:
COMM(φ1(x)+φ2(x)) =COMM(φ1(x))∗COMM(φ2(x))
Once the committer has has generated COMM(φ(x)), it
can carry out a (n, t) - secret sharing scheme to share the
polynomial among a set of n participants in such a way that
in the recovery phase a subset of at least t participants can
compute the secret polynomial. All secret shares (i,φ(i))
shared with the participants are evaluations of the polyno-
mial at a unique point i and are accompanied by a com-
mitment to a witness polynomial COMM(ψi(x)) such that
ψi(x) = φ(x)−φ(i)x−i . By leveraging the divisibility property of
the two polynomials {φ(x),ψ(x)} and the bilinear pairing
function e, it is trivial to verify that the secret share comes
from the committed polynomial [26]. This is carried out by
evaluating whether the following equality holds:
e(COMM(φi(x)),g2)
?
= e(COMM(ψi(x)),
gα2
gi2
)e(g1,g2)∆wi(i)
If the above holds, then the share is accepted. Otherwise,
the share is rejected.
This commitment scheme is unconditionally binding and
computationally hiding given the Discrete Logarithm as-
sumption holds [26]. This scheme can be easily extended to
provide unconditional hiding by combining it with another
scheme called Pedersen commitments [40] however we do
not implement it.
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